![\"Citizen](\"https:\/\/commonlawdictionary.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/citizen-dictionary-300x300.png\")
<\/div>\n<\/p>\n
Primary Definition<\/h2>\n
A<\/a> citizen<\/strong> is a<\/a> recognized member of a<\/a> political community, especially a<\/a> state or nation, who owes allegiance to that community and is entitled to the rights, protections, and legal status associated with membership. Citizenship may arise by birth, descent, naturalization, collective grant, or another method established by constitutional or statutory law.<\/p>\n The word has several related senses:<\/p>\n Citizenship ordinarily combines status<\/em>, allegiance<\/em>, protection<\/em>, and participation<\/em>. These elements should not be treated as identical. A<\/a> person may possess citizenship while living abroad, lack the immediate ability to exercise a<\/a> particular political right, or remain subject to duties that also apply to noncitizens. Conversely, many fundamental legal protections extend to every person within a<\/a> jurisdiction<\/a> and are not reserved exclusively to citizens.<\/p>\n Citizen<\/em> entered Middle English during the thirteenth or early fourteenth century in forms such as citisein<\/em> and citezein<\/em>. It came through Anglo-French and Old French words meaning an inhabitant of a<\/a> city. Those words were derived from cité<\/em>, meaning “city,” which ultimately came from the Latin civitas<\/em>.<\/p>\n Latin civitas<\/em> could signify citizenship, the condition or rights of a<\/a> citizen, the body of citizens, or the organized commonwealth itself. It was related to civis<\/em>, a<\/a> citizen or fellow member of the civic community. The same family of words produced English terms such as city<\/em>, civil<\/em>, civic<\/em>, and civilization<\/em>.<\/p>\n The earliest English sense referred primarily to a<\/a> town or city inhabitant, often one possessing recognized borough rights. By the late Middle Ages, the meaning expanded to include a<\/a> member of a<\/a> country or political state, distinguished from an alien. By approximately the seventeenth century, private<\/a> citizen<\/em> could also distinguish an ordinary person from a<\/a> soldier, magistrate, or other public<\/a> officer.<\/p>\n Thus, the modern national meaning was not created all at once. It developed from the older idea that political membership was rooted in an organized city or civic community. The documented etymology does not support claims that the word secretly means “slave,” “corporate employee,” or “government-owned person.” Such assertions are modern speculative constructions rather than accepted linguistic history.<\/p>\n Ancient Greek city-states associated citizenship with membership in the polis<\/em>. In democratic Athens, full political citizenship was generally restricted to free adult males meeting ancestry requirements. Citizens could participate in assemblies, hold certain offices, serve as jurors, own protected civic property, and bear<\/a> military obligations. Women, enslaved people, resident foreigners, and many laborers lacked full political membership. Ancient citizenship therefore provided important privileges while also functioning as an exclusionary status.<\/p>\n Roman citizenship likewise carried a<\/a> defined legal position. Depending on the period and class of citizenship, it could include rights relating to lawful marriage, property, contract, voting, public<\/a> office, trial, and appeal<\/a>. Citizenship gradually extended beyond the city of Rome through grants to communities, freed persons, provincial elites, and military veterans. In 212 CE, the Constitutio Antoniniana<\/em> of Emperor Caracalla broadly granted Roman citizenship to the empire’s<\/a> free inhabitants, subject to historically debated exceptions and qualifications.<\/p>\n Greek and Roman institutions influenced later political thought, but the English word citizen<\/em> came through medieval French rather than by direct adoption of an unchanged ancient legal office. Ancient citizenship should therefore be treated as historical background, not as proof that every modern citizen occupies the exact legal position of a<\/a> Greek or Roman citizen.<\/p>\n In medieval England, civic status often concerned membership in a<\/a> chartered borough or city. A<\/a> citizen or freeman might possess commercial privileges, voting rights, guild membership, or eligibility for municipal office. At the national level, however, English common law<\/a> ordinarily spoke of the king’s<\/a> subjects<\/em> rather than citizens.<\/p>\n The common-law doctrine expressed in Calvin’s<\/a> Case<\/em> in 1608 treated birth within the sovereign’s<\/a> allegiance as a<\/a> principal basis of natural-born subjectship. Allegiance and protection were understood as reciprocal: the subject owed obedience, while the sovereign owed protection according to law. This territorial principle later influenced American<\/a> law, although republican citizenship did not preserve every feature of monarchical subjectship.<\/p>\n The American<\/a> and French Revolutions helped elevate citizen<\/em> over subject<\/em> as the preferred language of republican political membership. “Citizen” increasingly suggested that the people were constituents of the political order rather than merely persons owing obedience to a<\/a> hereditary monarch. Nevertheless, republican citizenship still involves lawful authority, allegiance, duties, and enforceable jurisdiction<\/a>; it does not mean that each individual is personally sovereign in the international or governmental sense.<\/p>\n The Torah<\/a> does not present modern passport-based nationality or citizenship law. English translations sometimes use citizen<\/em> for the Hebrew ezrach<\/em>, meaning a<\/a> native, native-born inhabitant, or established member of the land. This person is frequently contrasted with the ger<\/em>, a<\/a> stranger, sojourner, resident outsider, or, in later interpretive settings, a<\/a> convert.<\/p>\n Exodus 12:49 declares that one Torah or law is to apply to the native and the stranger dwelling among Israel<\/a>. Related principles appear<\/a> in Leviticus 24:22 and Numbers 15. These passages express legal accountability and a<\/a> significant measure of equal treatment, particularly where the same offense, ritual rule, or communal standard is involved.<\/p>\n This equality was not a<\/a> declaration that every social, tribal, hereditary, territorial, and covenantal distinction had ceased to exist. Priestly office, tribal inheritance, land allotment, Passover participation, and other matters could depend upon specific covenantal conditions. The Torah<\/a>’s<\/a> legal structure therefore combined distinctions in communal status with repeated commands not to oppress the stranger and to administer justice<\/a> impartially.<\/p>\n Israelite<\/a> membership was covenantal as well as territorial. It involved ancestry, household, worship<\/a>, law, circumcision in specified contexts, and allegiance to the God of Israel<\/a>. A<\/a> biblical “native” is therefore not simply equivalent to a<\/a> modern statutory citizen, and a<\/a> ger<\/em> should not automatically be equated with every modern category of tourist, immigrant, refugee, permanent resident, or naturalized citizen.<\/p>\n In the New Testament, Acts describes Paul invoking his Roman citizenship when authorities sought to punish or detain him without the procedure due to a<\/a> Roman citizen. His example shows citizenship functioning as a<\/a> legally enforceable status rather than merely an emotional identity. Philippians 3:20 uses the language of citizenship or commonwealth in heaven. That spiritual image does not necessarily abolish earthly civil obligations; it establishes a<\/a> higher allegiance by which earthly conduct and authority are morally judged.<\/p>\n Historical English common law<\/a> centered upon subjectship<\/em>, allegiance, and birth within the sovereign’s<\/a> dominion. A<\/a> natural-born subject differed from an alien, while naturalization and denization supplied methods by which an outsider could acquire some or all of the legal capacities associated with membership.<\/p>\n American<\/a> law inherited aspects of the territorial common-law rule but adapted them to a<\/a> constitutional republic. The federal Constitution used the word citizen<\/em> in provisions concerning congressional qualifications, presidential eligibility, interstate privileges and immunities, and federal judicial jurisdiction<\/a>, yet the original Constitution did not provide one comprehensive definition applicable to every question.<\/p>\n The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified on July 9, 1868, states that persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction<\/a> are citizens of the United States and of the state in which they reside. This language repudiated the central citizenship holding of Dred Scott v<\/a>. Sandford<\/em> and constitutionally secured citizenship for formerly enslaved people and their descendants.<\/p>\n Federal statutes further govern citizenship at birth, citizenship acquired through parents, and naturalization after birth. Under 8 U<\/a>.S<\/a>.C<\/a>. § 1101, a<\/a> “national of the United States” includes a<\/a> citizen and also certain persons who owe permanent allegiance to the United States without possessing citizenship. A<\/a> lawful permanent resident is therefore not automatically a<\/a> citizen, and a<\/a> noncitizen U<\/a>.S<\/a>. national is not the same legal category as an alien.<\/p>\n On June 30, 2026, the United States Supreme Court held in Trump v<\/a>. Barbara<\/em> that children<\/a> born in the United States to parents unlawfully or temporarily present are subject to United States jurisdiction<\/a> and are citizens at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision preserved broad territorial birthright citizenship while generating dissent concerning allegiance, domicile, and the original meaning of “subject to the jurisdiction<\/a> thereof.”<\/p>\n Citizenship may carry rights or legal capacities that include:<\/p>\n Civic responsibilities commonly include obedience to valid law, taxation, truthful dealings with public<\/a> authorities, jury service when summoned and qualified, and defense of the community where lawfully required. Voting is an important civic responsibility but is not compulsory under current United States federal law.<\/p>\n Military obligation is not an exclusive test of citizenship. Nearly all male<\/a> U<\/a>.S<\/a>. citizens and many male<\/a> immigrants between eighteen and twenty-five must register with the Selective Service System, subject to statutory exceptions. Registration is not enlistment, and the requirement’s<\/a> application to noncitizens demonstrates that public<\/a> duties do not always track citizenship status exactly. Conversely, qualifying military service may provide a<\/a> special route to naturalization.<\/p>\n A<\/a> person<\/strong> may receive constitutional, statutory, and common-law protections without being a<\/a> citizen. Due process and equal protection provisions frequently use the broader term person<\/em>. A<\/a> resident<\/strong> lives in a<\/a> place, while domicile<\/strong> generally refers to a<\/a> person’s<\/a> permanent legal home. Citizenship, residence, and domicile may coincide, but they answer different legal questions.<\/p>\n Federal diversity jurisdiction<\/a> also uses “citizenship” in a<\/a> specialized sense connected to state domicile. Congress may deem a<\/a> corporation a<\/a> citizen of its state of incorporation and the state of its principal place of business for jurisdictional purposes. This is a<\/a> statutory legal attribution; it does not transform a<\/a> corporation into a<\/a> natural human citizen with every political or spiritual attribute of a<\/a> person.<\/p>\n Citizenship status is principally created and governed by constitutional provisions, statutes, treaties, and judicial decisions. Equity may supply remedies or prevent an unconscionable use of procedure, but a<\/a> court of equity does not ordinarily invent national citizenship contrary to controlling law.<\/p>\n Spiritually, citizenship signifies belonging, allegiance, mutual obligation, and participation in an ordered community. It asks not only, “What may I<\/a> claim<\/a>?” but also, “To whom am I<\/a> faithful, and what duties do I<\/a> owe?” A<\/a> healthy concept of citizenship balances rights with responsibility and authority with justice<\/a>.<\/p>\n The expression “citizen of heaven” has often been interpreted to mean that divine law, truth, and righteousness hold priority over corrupt<\/a> human commands. This does not necessarily authorize contempt for all civil government. Biblical texts also recognize civil order, payment of lawful obligations, peaceful conduct, and respect for legitimate authority. The spiritual tension arises when human commands conflict with conscience or divine obligation.<\/p>\n From an interpretive common-law perspective, the citizen may be viewed as a<\/a> responsible member of the body politic rather than a<\/a> passive object of administration. This is a<\/a> moral and political interpretation, not a<\/a> rule that allows an individual to cancel statutory duties by private<\/a> declaration. Meaningful self-government requires informed judgment, accountability, service, and resistance to arbitrary power through lawful means.<\/p>\n Modern speech uses citizen<\/em> both technically and broadly. In immigration and nationality law it denotes a<\/a> formal status. In phrases such as concerned citizen<\/em>, citizen journalist<\/em>, citizen science<\/em>, and corporate citizen<\/em>, it emphasizes participation or responsibility rather than nationality.<\/p>\n Global citizen<\/em> describes identification with humanity beyond national borders, but it does not ordinarily create an enforceable international citizenship. Digital citizenship<\/em> concerns responsible participation in online communities. Second-class citizen<\/em> is a<\/a> critical expression for someone formally included in a<\/a> society but denied equal dignity, opportunity, or practical rights.<\/p>\n The term remains powerful because it joins legal membership with civic identity. A<\/a> passport may prove nationality, but the cultural ideal of citizenship includes knowledge, participation, public<\/a> virtue, and concern for the common good<\/a>.<\/p>\n Citizenship has often been criticized as both necessary and exclusionary. It protects political membership, yet the boundary between citizen and noncitizen can determine access to voting, movement, employment, public<\/a> benefits, land, security, and protection from removal. Historical citizenship systems frequently excluded people by race<\/a>, sex, ancestry, religion<\/a>, class, conquest, or enslavement.<\/p>\n Modern controversies include territorial birthright citizenship, citizenship by descent, dual nationality, naturalization standards, denaturalization for fraud, the status of territorial populations, refugee protection, and statelessness. Disagreement also continues over whether citizenship should emphasize inherited identity, voluntary allegiance, civic participation, permanent residence, or universal human equality.<\/p>\n Claims associated with the “sovereign citizen” movement require particular caution. Courts have repeatedly rejected arguments that a<\/a> person can escape criminal jurisdiction<\/a>, taxation, licensing laws, debts, or court authority merely by declaring independence from government, renouncing a<\/a> supposed corporate identity, altering capitalization, or describing oneself only as a<\/a> state citizen. A<\/a> person may challenge jurisdiction<\/a>, constitutionality, statutory interpretation, or governmental misconduct through recognized law and evidence, but private<\/a> word formulas do not unilaterally erase public<\/a> obligations.<\/p>\n It is nevertheless legitimate to criticize governmental overreach, unequal treatment, involuntary loss of rights, or the reduction of citizenship to administrative compliance. The mistake lies in confusing a<\/a> philosophical objection to state power with a<\/a> legally effective change of status.<\/p>\n A<\/a> citizen is a<\/a> legally and civically recognized member of a<\/a> political community. The term began with the inhabitant of a<\/a> city, absorbed older Greek and Roman ideas of civic membership, developed through medieval borough practice and common-law allegiance, and became central to republican government.<\/p>\n Citizenship may confer protection, political participation, security of residence, and a<\/a> recognized place within the body politic. It also carries obligations and has historically been used to exclude. Its sound interpretation therefore requires careful distinctions among documented history, moral ideals, constitutional law, statutes, judicial decisions, and disputed political claims.<\/p>\n At its highest civic and spiritual meaning, citizenship is not merely permission to receive benefits. It is a<\/a> relationship of belonging, lawful protection, responsible participation, and accountable allegiance.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Citizen<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":0,"menu_order":0,"template":"","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"glossary-categories":[],"glossary-tags":[],"glossary-languages":[],"class_list":["post-1134","glossary","type-glossary","status-publish","hentry"],"post_title":"Citizen","post_content":"Citizen\n\n\n\n A citizen<\/strong> is a recognized member of a political community, especially a state or nation, who owes allegiance to that community and is entitled to the rights, protections, and legal status associated with membership. Citizenship may arise by birth, descent, naturalization, collective grant, or another method established by constitutional or statutory law.<\/p>\n\n The word has several related senses:<\/p>\n\n Citizenship ordinarily combines status<\/em>, allegiance<\/em>, protection<\/em>, and participation<\/em>. These elements should not be treated as identical. A person may possess citizenship while living abroad, lack the immediate ability to exercise a particular political right, or remain subject to duties that also apply to noncitizens. Conversely, many fundamental legal protections extend to every person within a jurisdiction and are not reserved exclusively to citizens.<\/p>\n\n Citizen<\/em> entered Middle English during the thirteenth or early fourteenth century in forms such as citisein<\/em> and citezein<\/em>. It came through Anglo-French and Old French words meaning an inhabitant of a city. Those words were derived from cit\u00e9<\/em>, meaning \u201ccity,\u201d which ultimately came from the Latin civitas<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n Latin civitas<\/em> could signify citizenship, the condition or rights of a citizen, the body of citizens, or the organized commonwealth itself. It was related to civis<\/em>, a citizen or fellow member of the civic community. The same family of words produced English terms such as city<\/em>, civil<\/em>, civic<\/em>, and civilization<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n The earliest English sense referred primarily to a town or city inhabitant, often one possessing recognized borough rights. By the late Middle Ages, the meaning expanded to include a member of a country or political state, distinguished from an alien. By approximately the seventeenth century, private citizen<\/em> could also distinguish an ordinary person from a soldier, magistrate, or other public officer.<\/p>\n\n Thus, the modern national meaning was not created all at once. It developed from the older idea that political membership was rooted in an organized city or civic community. The documented etymology does not support claims that the word secretly means \u201cslave,\u201d \u201ccorporate employee,\u201d or \u201cgovernment-owned person.\u201d Such assertions are modern speculative constructions rather than accepted linguistic history.<\/p>\n\n Ancient Greek city-states associated citizenship with membership in the polis<\/em>. In democratic Athens, full political citizenship was generally restricted to free adult males meeting ancestry requirements. Citizens could participate in assemblies, hold certain offices, serve as jurors, own protected civic property, and bear military obligations. Women, enslaved people, resident foreigners, and many laborers lacked full political membership. Ancient citizenship therefore provided important privileges while also functioning as an exclusionary status.<\/p>\n\n Roman citizenship likewise carried a defined legal position. Depending on the period and class of citizenship, it could include rights relating to lawful marriage, property, contract, voting, public office, trial, and appeal. Citizenship gradually extended beyond the city of Rome through grants to communities, freed persons, provincial elites, and military veterans. In 212 CE, the Constitutio Antoniniana<\/em> of Emperor Caracalla broadly granted Roman citizenship to the empire\u2019s free inhabitants, subject to historically debated exceptions and qualifications.<\/p>\n\n Greek and Roman institutions influenced later political thought, but the English word citizen<\/em> came through medieval French rather than by direct adoption of an unchanged ancient legal office. Ancient citizenship should therefore be treated as historical background, not as proof that every modern citizen occupies the exact legal position of a Greek or Roman citizen.<\/p>\n\n In medieval England, civic status often concerned membership in a chartered borough or city. A citizen or freeman might possess commercial privileges, voting rights, guild membership, or eligibility for municipal office. At the national level, however, English common law ordinarily spoke of the king\u2019s subjects<\/em> rather than citizens.<\/p>\n\n The common-law doctrine expressed in Calvin\u2019s Case<\/em> in 1608 treated birth within the sovereign\u2019s allegiance as a principal basis of natural-born subjectship. Allegiance and protection were understood as reciprocal: the subject owed obedience, while the sovereign owed protection according to law. This territorial principle later influenced American law, although republican citizenship did not preserve every feature of monarchical subjectship.<\/p>\n\n The American and French Revolutions helped elevate citizen<\/em> over subject<\/em> as the preferred language of republican political membership. \u201cCitizen\u201d increasingly suggested that the people were constituents of the political order rather than merely persons owing obedience to a hereditary monarch. Nevertheless, republican citizenship still involves lawful authority, allegiance, duties, and enforceable jurisdiction; it does not mean that each individual is personally sovereign in the international or governmental sense.<\/p>\n\n The Torah does not present modern passport-based nationality or citizenship law. English translations sometimes use citizen<\/em> for the Hebrew ezrach<\/em>, meaning a native, native-born inhabitant, or established member of the land. This person is frequently contrasted with the ger<\/em>, a stranger, sojourner, resident outsider, or, in later interpretive settings, a convert.<\/p>\n\n Exodus 12:49 declares that one Torah or law is to apply to the native and the stranger dwelling among Israel. Related principles appear in Leviticus 24:22 and Numbers 15. These passages express legal accountability and a significant measure of equal treatment, particularly where the same offense, ritual rule, or communal standard is involved.<\/p>\n\n This equality was not a declaration that every social, tribal, hereditary, territorial, and covenantal distinction had ceased to exist. Priestly office, tribal inheritance, land allotment, Passover participation, and other matters could depend upon specific covenantal conditions. The Torah\u2019s legal structure therefore combined distinctions in communal status with repeated commands not to oppress the stranger and to administer justice impartially.<\/p>\n\n Israelite membership was covenantal as well as territorial. It involved ancestry, household, worship, law, circumcision in specified contexts, and allegiance to the God of Israel. A biblical \u201cnative\u201d is therefore not simply equivalent to a modern statutory citizen, and a ger<\/em> should not automatically be equated with every modern category of tourist, immigrant, refugee, permanent resident, or naturalized citizen.<\/p>\n\n In the New Testament, Acts describes Paul invoking his Roman citizenship when authorities sought to punish or detain him without the procedure due to a Roman citizen. His example shows citizenship functioning as a legally enforceable status rather than merely an emotional identity. Philippians 3:20 uses the language of citizenship or commonwealth in heaven. That spiritual image does not necessarily abolish earthly civil obligations; it establishes a higher allegiance by which earthly conduct and authority are morally judged.<\/p>\n\n Historical English common law centered upon subjectship<\/em>, allegiance, and birth within the sovereign\u2019s dominion. A natural-born subject differed from an alien, while naturalization and denization supplied methods by which an outsider could acquire some or all of the legal capacities associated with membership.<\/p>\n\n American law inherited aspects of the territorial common-law rule but adapted them to a constitutional republic. The federal Constitution used the word citizen<\/em> in provisions concerning congressional qualifications, presidential eligibility, interstate privileges and immunities, and federal judicial jurisdiction, yet the original Constitution did not provide one comprehensive definition applicable to every question.<\/p>\n\n The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified on July 9, 1868, states that persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction are citizens of the United States and of the state in which they reside. This language repudiated the central citizenship holding of Dred Scott v. Sandford<\/em> and constitutionally secured citizenship for formerly enslaved people and their descendants.<\/p>\n\n Federal statutes further govern citizenship at birth, citizenship acquired through parents, and naturalization after birth. Under 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1101, a \u201cnational of the United States\u201d includes a citizen and also certain persons who owe permanent allegiance to the United States without possessing citizenship. A lawful permanent resident is therefore not automatically a citizen, and a noncitizen U.S. national is not the same legal category as an alien.<\/p>\n\n On June 30, 2026, the United States Supreme Court held in Trump v. Barbara<\/em> that children born in the United States to parents unlawfully or temporarily present are subject to United States jurisdiction and are citizens at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision preserved broad territorial birthright citizenship while generating dissent concerning allegiance, domicile, and the original meaning of \u201csubject to the jurisdiction thereof.\u201d<\/p>\n\n Citizenship may carry rights or legal capacities that include:<\/p>\n\n Civic responsibilities commonly include obedience to valid law, taxation, truthful dealings with public authorities, jury service when summoned and qualified, and defense of the community where lawfully required. Voting is an important civic responsibility but is not compulsory under current United States federal law.<\/p>\n\n Military obligation is not an exclusive test of citizenship. Nearly all male U.S. citizens and many male immigrants between eighteen and twenty-five must register with the Selective Service System, subject to statutory exceptions. Registration is not enlistment, and the requirement\u2019s application to noncitizens demonstrates that public duties do not always track citizenship status exactly. Conversely, qualifying military service may provide a special route to naturalization.<\/p>\n\n A person<\/strong> may receive constitutional, statutory, and common-law protections without being a citizen. Due process and equal protection provisions frequently use the broader term person<\/em>. A \n
Etymology and Origin<\/h2>\n
Cultural and Historical Context<\/h2>\n
Ancient Civic Membership<\/h3>\n
Medieval and Common-Law Development<\/h3>\n
Biblical \/ Torah Context<\/h2>\n
Legal Implications<\/h2>\n
Historical Common Law<\/h3>\n
Constitutional and Statutory Law<\/h3>\n
Rights, Duties, and Protections<\/h3>\n
\n
Citizenship Is Not the Same as Personhood, Residence, or Domicile<\/h3>\n
Spiritual Meaning<\/h2>\n
Modern Usage<\/h2>\n
Controversies \/ Criticisms<\/h2>\n
Conclusion<\/h2>\n
Sources \/ Further Reading<\/h2>\n
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<\/div>\n\nPrimary Definition<\/h2>\n\n
\n
Etymology and Origin<\/h2>\n\n
Cultural and Historical Context<\/h2>\n\n
Ancient Civic Membership<\/h3>\n\n
Medieval and Common-Law Development<\/h3>\n\n
Biblical \/ Torah Context<\/h2>\n\n
Legal Implications<\/h2>\n\n
Historical Common Law<\/h3>\n\n
Constitutional and Statutory Law<\/h3>\n\n
Rights, Duties, and Protections<\/h3>\n\n
\n
Citizenship Is Not the Same as Personhood, Residence, or Domicile<\/h3>\n\n